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ABSTRACT
Background
Previous studies have indicated that International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic programs
have influenced health-care infrastructure in recipient countries. The post-communist Eastern
European and former Soviet Union countries experienced relatively similar political and
economic changes over the past two decades, and participated in IMF programs of varying size
and duration. We empirically examine how IMF programs related to changes in tuberculosis
incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates among these countries.
Methods and Findings
We performed multivariate regression of two decades of tuberculosis incidence, prevalence,
and mortality data against variables potentially influencing tuberculosis program outcomes in
21 post-communist countries for which comparative data are available. After correcting for
confounding variables, as well as potential detection, selection, and ecological biases, we
observed that participating in an IMF program was associated with increased tuberculosis
incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates by 13.9%, 13.2%, and 16.6%, respectively. Each
additional year of participation in an IMF program was associated with increased tuberculosis
mortality rates by 4.1%, and each 1% increase in IMF lending was associated with increased
tuberculosis mortality rates by 0.9%. On the other hand, we estimated a decrease in
tuberculosis mortality rates of 30.7% (95% confidence interval, 18.3% to 49.5%) associated with
exiting the IMF programs. IMF lending did not appear to be a response to worsened health
outcomes; rather, it appeared to be a precipitant of such outcomes (Granger- and Sims-
causality tests), even after controlling for potential political, socioeconomic, demographic, and
health-related confounders. In contrast, non-IMF lending programs were connected with
decreased tuberculosis mortality rates ( 7.6%, 95% confidence interval, 1.0% to 14.1%). The
associations observed between tuberculosis mortality and IMF programs were similar to those
observed when evaluating the impact of IMF programs on tuberculosis incidence and
prevalence. While IMF programs were connected with large reductions in generalized
government expenditures, tuberculosis program coverage, and the number of physicians per
capita, non-IMF lending programs were not significantly associated with these variables.
Conclusions
IMF economic reform programs are associated with significantly worsened tuberculosis
incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates in post-communist Eastern European and former
Soviet countries, independent of other political, socioeconomic, demographic, and health
changes in these countries. Future research should attempt to examine how IMF programs may
have related to other non-tuberculosis–related health outcomes.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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A major barrier to effective tuberculosis control has been
the capacity of health systems to detect and adequately treat
infected persons [1–4]. The World Health Organization
(WHO) has promoted a policy of expanding directly observed
therapy (DOTS) for tuberculosis control, which critically
depends upon the availability of doctors, nurses, community
health-care workers, and associated laboratory and hospital
infrastructure. In resource-poor settings, international don-
ations and ﬁnancial lending play a crucial part in determin-
ing how such programs will expand and how successful they
might be [5–7].
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a major
source of capital for ﬁnancially ailing countries, including
capital used for health program development. Like most
international lending institutions, the IMF seeks to ensure
that it will recover its loans from borrowers. To reduce the
risk of loan defaults, the IMF requires a set of strict
‘‘conditionalities’’ on its lending, which include economic
programs that countries must agree to comply with in order
to receive funds. According to the IMF, the objective of these
programs is to achieve macroeconomic stability and eco-
nomic growth: ‘‘Our primary objective is growth. In my view
there is no longer any ambiguity about this. It is toward
growth that our programs and their conditionality are
aimed’’ [8].
Whether these IMF programs have impacted health and
health infrastructure has been a source of ongoing con-
troversy. In the mid-1980s, a UNICEF report (Adjustment with a
Human Face) suggested that IMF structural adjustment
programs had disenfranchised poor populations [7]. A decade
later some academics and NGOs suggested that the con-
servative inﬂationary targets of IMF programs (being set
often lower than 5%) were undermining infectious disease
control efforts, particularly in the context of HIV/AIDS and
tuberculosis epidemics [9–15]. Such targets constrained
public health and social spending, for example by reducing
public social expenditure and placing caps on public wage
bills, and led to restructured health-care ﬁnancing and
delivery, often via privatizing health services [9,10,12]. (The
World Bank and IMF do not advise governments to reduce
social expenditures; however, the ofﬁcials are fully aware that
in practice adjustment policies often translate into reduced
investment in health, education, and social services in order
to meet economic benchmarks) [16]. Linkages between the
IMF and health have been hypothesized for a variety of
health-related issues, including the emigration of health
personnel [11,13], reduction of surveillance and disease
testing [14–16], scalebacks of social safety nets [10,12],
declining sustainability of subsistence economies [8,14,17],
urbanization and migration patterns [14,16,18], and increased
impoverishment and inequality [6,7,9,16]. More recently, the
Center for Global Development convened a working group of
leading economists from the IMF and World Bank, as well as
public health experts, to assess the IMF’s effect on the health
sector (Does the IMF Constrain Health Spending in Poor Countries?)
[5]. The ﬁnal report concluded that ‘‘in a number of ways IMF
actions have unduly constrained countries’ policy choices and
that it needs to do more to help explore a broader range of
policy options’’ (page 56, [5]). However, to our knowledge,
these hypothesized effects of IMF programs on health and
health infrastructure have yet to be tested with empirical data
[5,16].
The post-communist Eastern European (EE) and former
Soviet Union (FSU) countries provide a quasi-natural
experimental setting for studying the relationship between
IMF programs and infectious disease control. Nearly every
EE/FSU country during the early- to mid-1990s participated
in an IMF program for the ﬁrst time, and country
participation in relatively similar IMF programs occurred in
different periods, for different loan sizes, and for varying
durations (table I in Text S1). We studied how these different
IMF programs impacted upon differences in tuberculosis
incidence, prevalence, and mortality trends among EE/FSU
countries. Tuberculosis was the subject of interest because of
the extensive longitudinal data available to study the disease
in EE/FSU countries, and because tuberculosis incidence and
prevalence is an indicator of societal health [19]. Existing
medical and public health literature has suggested a relation-
ship between IMF programs and infectious disease outcomes,
and the effect is hypothesized to be mediated via the health
system, to which tuberculosis outcomes are sensitive [10].
During the 1990s, EE/FSU countries experienced signiﬁcant
and increasing variations in their tuberculosis burdens: in the
FSU, tuberculosis mortality rates doubled from 1991 to 2002
(from 6.2 to 13.3 per 100,000 population), while mortality in
the EE started from a similar level but alternatively fell by
roughly 40% (from 5.6 to 3.2 per 100,000 population) (see
also table I and II in Text S1). In parallel, among FSU
countries the average outstanding IMF debt was $850 million
for an average of 10.3 y in 1989–2005, compared to $270
million among EE countries for an average exposure time of
5.5 y. The country with the greatest proportional tuberculosis
mortality rate drop over this period, Slovenia, was the only
one that did not partake in an IMF program. Today,
tuberculosis rates in the FSU countries rank among the
worst in the world, and the WHO notes that FSU is the only
region lagging behind on Millennium Development Goal
number 6 target to ‘‘halt and reverse’’ the spread of
tuberculosis [1].
Figure 1 compares average trends in tuberculosis mortality
rates for EE/FSU countries participating in IMF programs and
countries that were not participating from 1991 to 2003.
Countries involved in IMF programs experienced signiﬁ-
cantly different trajectories in tuberculosis mortality rates
than countries that were not under these programs. In this
study, we examine the relationship revealed by this ﬁgure, by
further characterizing the relationship between IMF lending
programs and tuberculosis incidence, prevalence, and mor-
tality trends among the post-communist EE and FSU
countries.
Methods
Four sets of health outcomes data were used in the analysis,
all of which are from the WHO. Tuberculosis incidence,
prevalence, mortality, and DOTS population coverage levels
and treatment success rates were obtained from the WHO
Global Tuberculosis Database [20,21]; HIV and AIDS preva-
lence data were obtained from the WHO/UNAIDS Global
HIV database [22]. IMF data were from the World Bank World
Development Indicators (WDI) [23]. Control variables were
from the WHO European Health For All Database 2007
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sources are further described in Text S2.
Despite evidence of underreporting in homicide and
suicide data, in particular for the North Caucuses, the
consensus among scholars of mortality data in transition
has been that they are sufﬁciently reliable to permit
comparative studies [25–30]. Nonetheless, we coped with data
monitoring and quality through the use of several techniques.
First, we introduced a set of dummy variables for each
country, which holds time-varying effects, such as the
strength of national surveillance systems, that are national
in scope constant within nations (though see the paragraph
on detection biases, below). These variables also correct for
factors that differ across countries but remain ﬁxed over
time, such as membership in the former Soviet Union or
proximity to Western Europe as well as initial transition
conditions and country predispositions to higher mortality.
This conservative modeling approach isolated how changes
within individual countries impacted upon their tuberculosis
mortality proﬁles [31], rendering the available data suitable to
answer our research question.
Selection bias may be an issue for assessing the effect of
IMF programs on tuberculosis incidence and mortality rates.
Participating in an IMF program may have been an act of
ﬁnancial desperation, reﬂecting ‘‘how sick the country was to
begin with,’’ which could be linked to higher tuberculosis
mortality rates irrespective of taking the IMF programs’
‘‘medicine.’’ We controlled for this ‘‘sick patient’’ possibility
using a lag of the change in overall log gross domestic
product (GDP) in our main models as well as other observed
ﬁnancial health measures in a series of robustness checks.
Our controls for differences between countries also net out
potential unobserved selection biases relating to country
predispositions to undertake IMF programs. Lastly, we
modeled the hazard of participating in an IMF program for
each country, and used this constructed variable to explicitly
control for potential unobserved selection bias (‘‘Heckman-
type’’ selection model or ‘‘control function’’ approach, see
the discussion in Text S7) [32–34].
We considered the impact of detection bias. If IMF
programs damaged public health capacity, they would be
expected to lead to underreporting of tuberculosis outcomes,
which would have reduced the likelihood of observing
evidence to support this hypothesis. On the other hand, if
IMF programs improved public health infrastructure, then
they could have led to improved surveillance, revealed by
increasing tuberculosis rates followed by eventual declines in
tuberculosis rates. We tested the relationship between IMF
programs and public health spending and resources in order
to characterize the relationship between IMF programs and
actual increases in tuberculosis rates, to determine whether
detection biases may have occurred. We also used controls for
DOTS treatment success and DOTS population coverage,
measures of quality and quantity of tuberculosis treatment, to
offset differences in tuberculosis infrastructure. Lastly, we
used a set of period effects to control for secular trends in the
mortality data that may have occurred as a result of changes
in detection capacity.
Several variables were introduced as controls, to examine
the independent association of IMF programs with tuber-
culosis outcomes. We controlled for overall economic
development; democratization, which has been theorized to
exert positive effects on health [35] and captures political
changes in each country; the occurrence of military or ethnic
conﬂict, which has been shown to adversely impact disease
incidence and mortality surveillance [21]; urbanization, which
may facilitate the transmission of tuberculosis but also
provide access to better health-care services, and serves as a
proxy for overall social development; population dependency
ratios, which reﬂect the stage of demographic transition and
population age-structure; and population education levels,
which captures the stock of human capital.
Thus, we specify the following log-linear regression model:
Log Tuberculosisit ¼a þ b1IMFit þ b2GDPit þ b3GDPCit 1
þ b4DEMit þ b5WARit þ b6URBANit
þ b7DEPit þ b8EDUCit þ li þ gt þ eit
ð1Þ
In Equation 1, i is country and t is year. IMF is a dummy
variable for whether a country was receiving IMF funding;
GDP is logged per capita in constant USD for the year 2000;
GDPc is the lag of GDP change; DEM is an index of
democratization from the Freedom House democracy in-
dicators database [36]; WAR is a dummy variable for whether
a country experienced military or ethnic conﬂict; URBAN is
the percentage of the country’s population living in urban
settings; EDUC is the percentage of the population that has
received tertiary education; l and g are sets of dummy
variables that control for country and period effects, as
described above. We subsequently add further variables to
test the associations of the duration of exposure to IMF
programs and the size of IMF loans with tuberculosis
outcomes. We also performed Granger- and Sims-causality
Figure 1. Trends in Tuberculosis Mortality Rates in Post-Communist
European Countries, By Region
Data sources: authors’ calculations, WHO Global Tuberculosis Database
2007 [20], and World Bank World Development Indicators 2005 edition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.g001
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whether IMF programs preceded and/or were contempora-
neous with tuberculosis outcomes (‘‘precedence’’) and (ii)
whether the future values added predictive value beyond
these measures as a negative check on our ﬁndings (based on
the principle that the future does not cause the past) (see
Text S4 for more details) [37,38]. Data were analyzed using
xtreg with the fe and cluster options in STATA version 9.2.
Results
Associations of IMF Programs with Tuberculosis
Outcomes
Figures 2–4 present the results of the 18 regression models
for tuberculosis incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates
with and without control variables. IMF program participa-
tion was associated with increases in tuberculosis incidence,
prevalence, and mortality by 13.9%, 13.3%, and 16.6%,
respectively. Since the results do not signiﬁcantly differ
across incidence, prevalence, and mortality rates (joint F-test,
p , 0.001), the rest of the analysis proceeds using mortality
rates because those data have been established as the most
valid and reliable, although parallel results were found for
incidence and prevalence (see tables I and II in Text S3).
Table 1 presents the results of the basic model for
tuberculosis mortality rates with the full set of control
variables. IMF program participation was signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with increases in tuberculosis mortality rates from
between 16% to 24% on average. Tuberculosis mortality
rates rose by an average of 2.2 deaths per 100,000 from 1992
to 2002 in the post-communist countries; the absolute
association of the IMF programs corresponds to 1.6 addi-
tional tuberculosis deaths per 100,000. Hence, participation
in IMF programs appears to be connected with more than
half of the increase in tuberculosis mortality rates observed in
this cohort of countries. This relationship holds even after
correcting for a broad set of potential confounders, including
a country’s level of economic development, potential ﬁnan-
cial desperation, socio-demographic factors, tuberculosis
infrastructure, and HIV/AIDS.
Both WHO tuberculosis treatment indices—DOTS success
rates and DOTS population coverage—had no signiﬁcant
associations with short-term tuberculosis mortality rates
when accounting for the other explanatory variables, includ-
ing IMF program lending. Adding HIV prevalence to the
model did not signiﬁcantly alter the coefﬁcient describing the
impact of IMF lending on tuberculosis mortality (model 2),
although we did ﬁnd evidence (similar to prior microlevel
studies) that greater HIV prevalence was associated with
tuberculosis mortality increases. Given the delay between
rising HIV prevalence and associated increases in tuber-
culosis incidence, prevalence, and mortality [39], the ﬁnding
that HIV prevalence did not impact upon the lending
coefﬁcient supports the hypothesis that IMF conditionalities
worsened tuberculosis mortality rates by damaging infra-
structure related to preventing mortality. Using AIDS
Figure 2. Forest Plot: Effects of IMF and Non-IMF Debt on Log Tuberculosis Incidence Results
Plot is based on six separate regression models using various controls and functional forms. Weighting used for aggregation calculated based on
confidence intervals provided in STATA’s standard metan module. Controls include either IMF or non-IMF program, change in log GDP, level of log GDP
per capita, democratization index, dummy for occurrence of military or ethnic conflict, population dependency ratios, percentage of the population
with tertiary education, and urbanization rates. CI, 95% confidence interval; FEM, fixed effects model, which uses a set of country dummies; POLS,
pooled OLS model; REM, random effects model. ‘‘Period’’ refers to a set of year dummies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.g002
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alternative measures did not change the results (unpublished
data).
We further tested the temporal patterns of the IMF’s
associations with tuberculosis mortality rates in Table 2 using
a dynamic model speciﬁcation that included both leads and
lags of the dummy for IMF participation. If our results were
possibly confounded by factors causing countries to take up
IMF programs and increasing tuberculosis mortality rates
(such as an ensuing ﬁnancial crisis or other unobserved
country ‘‘sickness’’), then the periods prior to the start of an
IMF program would likely have associations with increased
tuberculosis rates. As shown in Table 2, we ﬁnd that the
periods prior to IMF program participation did not have a
signiﬁcant association with tuberculosis mortality rates (using
a joint F-test, see Text S4 and [40] for details and additional
speciﬁcations). On the other hand, once the IMF program is
started, the negative associations endure for at least 4 y.
It may be the case that external debt is correlated with
higher tuberculosis mortality, and that the observation
associated with IMF programs is driven by reliance on donor
monies and not speciﬁcally on the IMF programs. We test
whether non-IMF lending, including credit from ofﬁcial and
private sources and which did not involve the same set of
economic conditionalities as the IMF programs, was associ-
ated with the relationships we observed with the IMF
variables. As shown in Table 3, the regression revealed no
evidence that the level of non-IMF lending had any
association with tuberculosis mortality rates. However, we
found that the dummy for non-IMF lending, shown in Figure
4, was signiﬁcantly associated with reduced tuberculosis
mortality ( 7.6%, 95% conﬁdence interval,  1.0% to
 14.1%).
Next, we evaluated different indicators of exposure to IMF
programs to determine whether the total amount of IMF
credit affected the observed outcomes. Larger debts may
exert a stronger effect on tuberculosis mortality, because the
IMF might have stricter standards on countries for making
progress in implementing conditionalities for whom default
would have greater consequences. The results of this study
provided evidence for a dose-response relationship of
increasing IMF loans: each 1% increase in IMF credit was
associated with increased tuberculosis mortality rates by
0.9%.
We also used a count variable for the number of years a
country was exposed to IMF programs. Since longer exposure
would correspond to greater institutional reforms, a higher
count would lead to greater effects on tuberculosis mortality.
We found that each extra year of exposure to an IMF
program was associated with increased tuberculosis mortality
by 4.1%.
Lastly, to further conﬁrm that causality runs from the IMF
programs to worse mortality, and not vice versa (that is, to
conﬁrm that the IMF did not loan more funds as a result of
observing whatever factors may have worsened tuberculosis
mortality), we tested the effects of exiting from an IMF
Figure 3. Forest Plot: Effects of IMF and Non-IMF Debt on Log Tuberculosis Prevalence
Results based on six separate regression models using various controls and functional forms. Weighting used for aggregation calculated based on
confidence intervals provided in STATA’s standard metan module. Controls include either IMF or non-IMF program, change in log GDP, level of log GDP
per capita, democratization index, dummy for occurrence of military or ethnic conflict, population dependency ratios, percentage of the population
with tertiary education, and urbanization rates. CI, 95% confidence interval; FEM, fixed effects model, which uses a set of country dummies; POLS,
pooled OLS model; REM, random effects model. ‘‘Period’’ refers to a set of year dummies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.g003
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program, tuberculosis mortality rates drop by 31% on average,
after correcting for economic changes, sociodemographic
variables, and variations in tuberculosis infrastructure (see also
tables I and II in Text S6). Similarly, although we identiﬁed a
signiﬁcant relationship between greater IMF lending and
increased tuberculosis mortality rates, we found no relation-
ship between the changes in IMF lending and the preceding
period’s change in tuberculosis mortality rates, meaning that
IMF loans did not increase as a result of observing worsening
tuberculosis mortality (tables I–III in Text S4 further describe
the results of ‘‘Granger-causality’’ tests).
Figure 4. Forest Plot: Effects of IMF and Non-IMF Debt on Log Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
Results based on six separate regression models using various controls and functional forms. Weighting used for aggregation calculated based on
confidence intervals provided in STATA’s standard metan module. Controls include either IMF or non-IMF program, change in log GDP, level of log GDP
per capita, democratization index, dummy for occurrence of military or ethnic conflict, population dependency ratios, percentage of the population
with tertiary education, and urbanization rates. CI, 95% confidence interval; FEM, fixed effects model, which uses a set of country dummies; POLS,
pooled OLS model; REM, random effects model. ‘‘Period’’ refers to a set of year dummies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.g004
Table 1. Associations of IMF Lending Programs with Log Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
Covariate Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dummy for IMF lending program 0.17** (0.06) 0.24*** (0.06) 0.17* (0.07) 0.17* (0.08)
DOTS success rate —— 0.00 (0.00) —
DOTS population coverage — — — 0.00 (0.00)
Log GDP per capita  0.20 (0.12)  0.09 (0.16)  0.30 (0.53) 0.14 (0.45)
Change in log GDP 0.01** (0.00) 0.01* (0.09) 0.01 (0.11) 0.00 (0.00)
Freedom House democracy index  0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)  0.00 (0.02)
Military conflict 0.17 12) 0.28 (0.16) — —
Population dependency ratio  0.03 (0.04)  0.02 (0.03)  0.04 (0.03)  0.02 (0.03)
Percentage of population with tertiary education  0.00 (0.01)  0.01 (0.01)  0.00 (0.00)  0.01 (0.01)
Percentage of population urban  0.07 (0.05)  0.06 (0.04)  0.18* (0.06)  0.10* (0.05)
Log HIV prevalence — 0.06** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Number of country-years 210 188 98 137
Number of countries 21 20 18 20
Within-R
2/total-R
2 0.55/0.94 0.60/0.95 0.57/0.99 0.44/0.97
Constant estimated but not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. Models include dummy variables for each country and period. DOTS is the main WHO
program for controlling tuberculosis. Tuberculosis data are from the WHO Global Tuberculosis Database [20].
*, p , 0.05; **, p , 0.01; ***, p , 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.t001
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macrolevel mechanisms that explain these associations, we
conducted a series of robustness checks and regression
diagnostics. Figure 5 presents a representative added-variable
plot to identify potential outliers. First we removed potential
outliers from this regression (liberally deﬁned by stand-
ardized residuals greater than the absolute value of 2). The
results were strengthened (b ¼ 5.3), but were statistically
indistinguishable from our original estimate (b ¼ 4.1). We
next removed regions where data quality has been suggested
to be misreported, such as the Central Asian countries. Again,
the results were consistent. We attempted to sequentially
include a broad set of additional variables used to capture
macroeconomic health, including inﬂation, hyperinﬂation,
changes in real wages, changes in monetary emissions, and
unemployment rates. We also added variables for macro-
economic policies implemented including price and trade
liberalization and foreign direct investment inﬂows. Adding
these additional controls for how sick the patient might have
been did not change the results (Table 4 and Text S8). Other
estimation modules, including xtregar and xtpcse (which
attempt to explicitly estimate serial correlation) were used,
and the results were consistent. We also re-ran these
robustness checks without controls for country and period
effects. In all cases, the coefﬁcients on the IMF programs were
even larger (b ¼ 0.29 in Figure 4), which emphasizes that our
reported estimates are conservative.
Association of IMF Programs with Tuberculosis
Infrastructure
One explanation for the above results is that the
associations of IMF programs with tuberculosis mortality
rates may be driven by reductions in state capacity, which
leads to drops in tuberculosis prevention and treatment
capacity. We examine this hypothesis using a variety of
dependent variables known to be associated with tuberculosis
control success from previous studies. By comparison, we test
the associations of a non-IMF debt regime.
Table 5 shows the results from a series of separate
regression models using a variety of dependent variables that
may mediate the observed relationship between IMF pro-
grams and tuberculosis mortality. IMF programs are linked to
a signiﬁcant 8% drop in government spending as a
percentage of GDP, a 7% drop in the number of physicians
per capita, and an average of 42% lower DOTS population
coverage (Text S5 provides a preliminary path-analysis).
We also test whether IMF programs were associated with
short-term increases in HIV prevalence. If the pathway
linking IMF programs to increased tuberculosis mortality
was through HIV prevalence, then we should ﬁnd a direct
relationship between IMF programs and increased HIV
prevalence. Instead, we ﬁnd no association between IMF
programs and HIV prevalence; together with our previous
results, this indicates that the association of IMF programs
with tuberculosis mortality was mediated by other mecha-
nisms.
Among all countries, IMF debt has a more negative
association than non-IMF debt in terms of these pathways
(Table 5). We did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant associations with
non-IMF debt, although the coefﬁcients for non-IMF debt
were generally in the direction of improved tuberculosis
control, suggesting that additional capital independent of
IMF programs may have provided an important source of
funding for strengthening health systems.
We then tested the relationships of IMF and non-IMF debts
with incarceration rates, which have been identiﬁed by
numerous studies as important drivers of localized tuber-
culosis epidemics [40,41]. Only non-IMF debt was linked to
greater incarceration rates at p , 0.05, which suggests that
incarceration may not have been one of the major pathways
linking IMF programs to the adverse associations with
tuberculosis outcomes.
Controlling for Selection Bias
Despite the robustness tests used in this assessment, and
strong evidence supporting the mechanism proposed to
explain how IMF conditionalities affect tuberculosis mortal-
ity, there may still remain potential for our results to have
been driven by some aspect of the changing environment that
we have not controlled for. We can address the issue of
unobserved selection bias directly by constructing, and
conditioning upon, a variable of the hazard for entering into
an IMF program, generated from a ﬁrst step bivariate probit
Table 2. Dynamic Association of IMF Lending Programs with Log
Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
Covariate Association with Log
Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
4 y before IMF  0.06 (0.03)
3 y before IMF 0.02 (0.03)
2 y before IMF  0.00 (0.03)
1 y before IMF 0.04 (0.05)
Current period start IMF 0.05 (0.04)*
1 y after IMF 0.10 (0.05)*
2 y after IMF 0.08 (0.03)*
3 y after IMF 0.10 (0.03)*
4 y after IMF 0.11 (0.04)*
Constant estimated but not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
country to reflect nonindependence of sampling and robustness to serial correlation.
Models include dummy variables for each country and period as well as controls used in
the basic specification in Equation 1. Tuberculosis data are from the WHO Global
Tuberculosis Database [20]. Further details of the Sims-causality test and alternative
specifications are provided in Text S4. Joint F-test on future lags, F(4, 20)¼1.28, p¼0.31.
*, p , 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.t002
Table 3. Associations of IMF Lending Programs with Log
Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
Covariate Effect on Log Tuberculosis
Mortality Rates
Log IMF credit 0.009 (0.003)***
Log non-IMF credit 0.001 (0.008)
Years exposed to IMF program 0.041 (0.010)***
Exit from IMF program  0.307 (0.060)***
Constant estimated but not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
country. Results presented from four separate regression models, which include dummy
variables for each country and period as well as controls used in the basic specification in
Equation 1. Tuberculosis data are from the WHO Global Tuberculosis Database [20].
***, p , 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.t003
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function’’ approach, Table 6 and Text S7) [32–34]. Once we
add controls for potential selection bias associated with IMF
lending, the negative association of IMF programs magniﬁes
to 35% at p , 0.001. The coefﬁcient on the variable for the
hazard of participating is signiﬁcant, but in the opposite
direction of the ‘‘sick patient’’ criticism ( 8.9%, p , 0.01).
Stated otherwise, the factors that predisposed countries to
take on IMF programs are linked to lower rates of tuber-
culosis mortality. This method of controlling for selection
bias has an inherently counterfactual interpretation: the
countries that started IMF programs, apart from the IMF
programs themselves, would have experienced improved
tuberculosis outcomes, net of our controls.
Discussion
Our results show that IMF economic reform programs are
strongly associated with rises in tuberculosis mortality rates
in post-communist Eastern European and FSU countries,
even after correcting for potential selection bias, tuberculosis
surveillance infrastructure, levels of economic development,
urbanization, and HIV/AIDS. We estimated an increase in
tuberculosis mortality rates when countries participate in an
IMF program, which was much greater than the reduction
that would have been expected had the countries not
participated in an IMF program. On the other hand, we
estimated a decrease in tuberculosis mortality rates associ-
ated with exiting an IMF program. Both the duration and
amount of IMF lending have an estimated dose-response
Table 4. Additional Sample and Specification Robustness Checks
Variables Covariates Coefficient of
Control
Coefficient of
IMF Program
Number of
Country-Years
Economic Log inflation 0.02 (0.02) 0.31*** (0.08) 162
Lag of hyperinflation (inflation . 30%) 0.02 (0.05) 0.16*** (0.06) 210
Real wage  0.003 (0.003) 0.15* (0.06) 203
Log unemployment rates 0.01 (0.05) 0.15*** (0.06) 200
Change in money supply (M2)  0.0006 (0.0024) 0.25*** (0.07) 161
Dummy for bank crisis  0.07 (0.06) 0.17*** (0.06) 210
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP  0.01 (0.00) 0.17** (0.06) 210
Policy EBRD index of price liberalization  0.04 (0.03) 0.17*** (0.06) 210
EBRD index of foreign exchange and trade liberalization 0.04 (0.03) 0.18** (0.04) 197
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country to reflect nonindependence of sampling and for robustness to serial correlation. Models also control for change in log GDP per
capita, level of log GDP per capita, democratization index, dummy for occurrence of military or ethnic conflict, population dependency ratios, percentage of the population with tertiary
education, urbanization rates, as well as country- and period-fixed effects. See Text S8 for more details. EBRD, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; GDP, gross domestic
product.
**, p , 0.01; ***, p , 0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.t004
Figure 5. Adjusted Association of Years of IMF Exposure on Log Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.g005
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IMF Programs and Tuberculosis Outcomesrelationship with tuberculosis mortality rates: each additional
year of participation in an IMF program was associated with
increases in tuberculosis mortality rates by 4.1%, and each
1% increase in IMF lending was associated with increases in
tuberculosis mortality rates by 0.9%. Debt to non-IMF
lenders was found to have a slightly favorable association
with tuberculosis mortality rates.
The robust results observed help to account for puzzling
differences in why countries such as Russia, which was
exposed to the IMF’s economic program for 13 y (corre-
sponding to a ;50% higher level in tuberculosis mortality
rates) did so much worse than Slovenia, which did not
undertake an IMF program. Similarly, Russia’s level of DOTS
coverage in 2003 was only 25%, whereas in Slovenia DOTS
coverage had reached 100% already by 1996. Clearly, IMF
programs are not the only explanation for variations in
tuberculosis control, but these results offer a partial account
of the ultimate correspondents of cross-country differences.
Our ﬁndings were robust to a broad set of socioeconomic
measures. However, there are several important limitations to
our analysis. First, as with all cross-country analysis, the
potential exists for ecologic fallacies, though we have
employed a number of well-accepted statistical tests for
causal inference that strongly support the link between IMF
policies and tuberculosis outcomes. The mechanism we
hypothesize for the IMF’s relationship to tuberculosis out-
comes is plausible, given the numerous studies suggesting
such a relationship between IMF conditionalities and
infectious disease outcomes [6,7,9–18]. We also applied
statistical methods less frequently used in epidemiology both
to examine the nature of selection bias (Heckman) and to
describe temporal causality (Granger and Sims) in a manner
that could be applied to future epidemiological studies
[37,38].
Another limitation to our ﬁndings is the potential for
detection biases arising from temporal variations in tuber-
culosis surveillance within countries. However, our results are
robust to a wide variety of health measures that can
reasonably be expected to serve as proxies for the observed
changes. If IMF programs did somehow lead to improved
tuberculosis surveillance, net of controls, they might have
lead to artifactual short-term increases in tuberculosis rates.
Yet all of our evidence points to the contrary: IMF programs
were linked to reduced government spending, less health
resources per capita, and decreased tuberculosis treatment
coverage. This suggests that IMF programs damaged health
surveillance infrastructure, and any residual detection bias in
our models rendered our conclusions conservative. It would
be appropriate to further investigate the relationship
between IMF policies and other diseases and their related
infrastructure, as this analysis is restricted to tuberculosis
outcomes and program variables. While our preliminary
analysis suggests a weak negative connection between IMF
programs and life expectancy levels more generally (unad-
justed Pearson’s R ¼  0.18, p , 0.01) that was similarly
observed for non-IMF debt albeit less signiﬁcant (unadjusted
Pearson’s R ¼  0.09, p ¼ 0.11), we cannot rule out that IMF
programs are not associated with some health improvements
in other ways we have not examined in this study.
Another limitation to our study is that the implementation
of IMF conditionalities themselves were not directly ob-
served, but rather reﬂected by entry into and exit from IMF
program participation, the size of the IMF loan, and the
duration of exposure to IMF lending. While IMF programs
typically involve a similar set of economic reforms, the
speciﬁc package is likely to vary across countries. However,
Table 5. Macro-Pathways of IMF Programs’ Associations with Tuberculosis Outcomes
Covariate Government Expenditures as a
Percentage of GDP
Log Incarceration
Rates
DOTS
Coverage
Log Physicians
per Capita
Log HIV
Prevalence
Dummy for IMF lending program  7.50** (2.21) 0.04 (0.04)  0.42*** (0.10)  0.07* (0.03) 0.19 (0.42)
Dummy for non-IMF lending 0.69 (0.73) 0.06* (0.02) 0.06 (0.03)  0.01 (0.02) 0.10 (0.15)
Constant estimated but not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. Results presented from five separate regression models. Models include dummy
variables for each country and period as well as controls used in the basic specification, except for DOTS coverage due to unavailable data. DOTS is the WHO program for controlling
tuberculosis. Tuberculosis data are from the WHO Global Tuberculosis Database [20]. Further path-analytic models that estimate the relationship between the putative intermediary
pathways and tuberculosis outcomes are presented in Text S5.
*, p , 0.05; **, p , 0.01; ***, p , 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.t005
Table 6. Associations of IMF Programs with Log Tuberculosis
Mortality Rates, Adjusted for Selection Bias
Covariate Association with Log
Tuberculosis Mortality Rates
Dummy for IMF lending program 0.35 (0.08)***
Risk of participating in IMF programs
(hazard rate, h
a)
 0.09 (0.04)**
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. Models include dummy
variables for each country and period as well as controls used in the basic specification in
Equation 1 augmented with log HIV rates.
ah, the hazard of participation in an IMF program, also referred to as the Inverse Mills
Ratio, is calculated as //U if under an IMF program, and  //1   U if not under an IMF
program from the probit model in table I of Text S7. For more details of this method see
Heckman 1979 or more recently Heckman 2004, or Przeworski 2003 [32–34] and Text S7.
The system of equations is thus:
TBit ¼ a þ cIMFit þ bXit þ hkit þ ti þ gt þ eit
IMFit ¼ a þ bXit þ fWit þ lit
Here X is the set of controls used in the main Equation 1, and W is a vector of variables
that have been suggested to affect the probability of country participation in an IMF
program by previous studies: lag of dummy for non-IMF debt, size of the largest titular
nationality, lag of number of countries participating in IMF programs, and lag of foreign
direct investment (percent of GDP) [34]. These covariates enter the probit model but are
excluded from the main regression [32–34] and are jointly significant at p , 0.05. Results
are robust to varying the set of variables included in the Z-vector. First-step probit results
are reported in table I of Text S7. Further details of Heckman’s selection method, applied
as a control function approach, are described in Text S7.
**, p , 0.01; ***, p , 0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050143.t006
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communist countries, the IMF economic reform programs
were much more homogenous than those implemented in
more diversiﬁed economic contexts [42]. Analyzing the
unique EE/FSU setting that enjoyed relatively strong public
health programs restricts our ability to generalize the results
to low-income countries with weaker health infrastructure.
Subsequent research should focus on resolving which speciﬁc
policy components of the IMF programs drove the adverse
tuberculosis outcomes identiﬁed in this study.
Although our ﬁndings support the hypothesis that the
adverse associations of IMF programs with tuberculosis
outcomes are constituted by reductions in tuberculosis
control infrastructure, more research is needed to specify
the mechanisms in greater detail and compare their relative
magnitude. Some possible mediating factors include abridged
access to, or decreased quality of, tuberculosis care that may
arise from shifting the burden of treatment costs onto
patients, or from privatizing health care services that may
exclude marginalized groups [6,43–45]. It is likely that our
results reﬂect the distributional consequences of IMF
programs for societies, especially since previous studies have
suggested that IMF programs have disproportionately hurt
the poor [46,47]. To analyze whether IMF programs have
increased poverty in the EE/FSU context, however, is beyond
the scope of our current study. Future research should also
attempt to resolve how tuberculosis program outcomes
observed in this study might be affected by reforms to IMF
programs.
The Center for Global Development report on whether
IMF programs constrain health spending notes ‘‘So humility
is required when pronouncing on the appropriate macro
framework unless country-speciﬁc evidence on such relation-
ships is available. In practice, policy choices must inevitably
be made under considerable uncertainty and need to take
account of the implied costs of different types of potential
mistakes. For example, risks to macroeconomic stability have
to be weighed against foregone opportunities for additional
public spending’’ (page 6, [5]). This study begs the same
question, but in the opposite direction: can the foregone
opportunities for health expenditure and the toll of human
lives be justiﬁed by the macroeconomic stability the IMF
might have created? Our regressions give us further insight to
this issue. The IMF has argued that ‘‘Wealthier is Healthier,’’
(to quote Pritchett and Summers [48]); that is, by promoting
economic development, public health will be improved. We
can ask how much wealthier a country has to be as a result of
an IMF lending program in order to offset the tuberculosis
associations identiﬁed here. The coefﬁcient on country
income per capita reveals that each 10% increase in GDP is
associated with decreases in tuberculosis by close to 2.5%.
Since an IMF program is connected with an increase in
tuberculosis by 17%, this means that per capita income would
have to nearly double to offset the rise in tuberculosis.
Unfortunately, no EE/FSU country has come near that level of
growth. The results presented here suggest that while
macroeconomic stability might spare some lives, the magni-
tude needed to offset the tuberculosis-related harms is
implausible at present. On the other hand, the World Bank
has recently shown that reducing tuberculosis in EE/FSU
countries would boost economic growth and has urged
countries to fully implement the Global Plan to Stop TB
(see [49] and www.stoptb.org).
The results of this analysis suggest that the IMF should take
into account the potential impact of its programs on
tuberculosis control systems. Although in recent years the
IMF has begun to play a direct role in supporting tuberculosis
and HIV/AIDS control efforts via poverty reduction programs
[50,51,13], the IMF should critically evaluate the indirect
effects of its economic programs on tuberculosis control
efforts. Securing health systems that are robust to tuber-
culosis should be a ﬁrst-order concern for international
ﬁnancial institutions when attempting to create the con-
ditions needed for sustainable economic development.
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Background. Tuberculosis—a contagious, bacterial infection—has killed
large numbers of people throughout human history. Over the last
century improvements in public health began to reduce the incidence
(the number of new cases in the population in a given time), prevalence
(the number of infected people), and mortality rate (number of people
dying each year) of tuberculosis in several countries. Many authorities
thought that tuberculosis had become a disease of the past. It has
become increasingly clear, however, that regions impacted by health and
economic changes since the 1980s have continued to face a high and
sometimes increasing burden of tuberculosis. In order to boost funding
and resources for combating the global tuberculosis problem, the United
Nations has set a target of halting and reversing increases in global
tuberculosis incidence by 2015 as one of its Millennium Development
Goals. Yet one region of the world—Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union—is not on track to achieve this goal.
Why Was This Study Done? To achieve these targets, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and tuberculosis physicians’ groups promote the
expansion of detection and treatment efforts against tuberculosis. But
these efforts depend on the maintenance of good health infrastructure
to fund and support health-care workers, clinics, and hospitals. In
countries with significant financial limitations, the development and
maintenance of these health system resources are often dependent
upon international donations and financial lending. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) is a major source of capital for resource-deprived
countries, but it is unclear whether its economic reform programs have
positive or negative effects on health and health infrastructures in
recipient countries. There are indications, for example, that recipient
countries sometimes reduce their public-health spending to meet the
economic targets set by the IMF as conditions for its loans. In this study,
the researchers examine the relationship between participating in IMF
lending programs of varying sizes and durations by 21 post-communist
Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries and
changes in tuberculosis incidence, prevalence, and mortality in these
countries during the past two decades.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? To examine how participation
in IMF lending programs affected tuberculosis control in these countries,
the researchers developed a series of statistical models that take into
account other variables (for example, directly observed therapy
programs, HIV rates, military conflict, and urbanization) that might have
affected tuberculosis control. Participation in an IMF program, they
report, was associated with increases in tuberculosis incidence,
prevalence, and mortality rate of about 15%, which corresponds to
hundreds of thousands of new cases and deaths in this region. Each
additional year of participation increased tuberculosis mortality rates by
4.1%; increases in the size of the IMF loan also corresponded to greater
tuberculosis mortality rates. Conversely, when countries left IMF
programs, tuberculosis mortality rates dropped by roughly one-third.
The authors’ further statistical tests indicated that IMF lending was not a
positive response to worsened tuberculosis control but precipitated this
adverse outcome and that lending from non-IMF sources of funding was
associated with decreases in tuberculosis mortality rates. Consistent with
these results, IMF (but not non-IMF) programs were associated with
reductions in government expenditures, tuberculosis program coverage,
and the number of doctors per capita in each country. These findings
associated with mortality were also found when analyzing tuberculosis
incidence and prevalence data.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings indicate that IMF
economic programs are associated with significantly worsened tuber-
culosis control in post-communist Central and Eastern European and
former Soviet Union countries, independent of other political, health,
and economic changes in these countries. Further research is needed to
discover exactly which aspects of the IMF programs were associated with
the adverse effects on tuberculosis control reported here and to see
whether IMF loans have similar effects on tuberculosis control in other
countries or on other non–tuberculosis-related health outcomes. For
now, these results challenge the proposition that the forms of economic
development promoted by the IMF necessarily improve public health. In
particular, they put the onus on the IMF to critically evaluate the direct
and indirect effects of its economic programs on public health.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0050143.
  This study is further discussed in a PLoS Medicine Perspective by
Murray and King
  The US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases provides
information on all aspects of tuberculosis, including a brief history of
the disease
  The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide several fact
sheets and other information resources about tuberculosis
  The World Health Organization provides information (in several
languages) on efforts to reduce the global burden of tuberculosis,
including information on the Stop TB Strategy and the 2008 report on
global tuberculosis control—surveillance, planning, financing
  Detailed information about the International Monetary Fund is
available on its Web site
  An article that asks ‘‘Does the IMF constrain health spending in poor
countries?’’ (with a link to a response from the IMF) is provided by the
Center for Global Development
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